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Andres Serrano's photograph 'Piss Christ' provoked a scandal in
Melbourne before it was even seen. The Roman Catholic Archbishop,
George Pell, pronounced it 'blasphemous and grossly sacrilegious')
and was supported by leaders of other churches in his desire to prevent
its public exhibition. Keith Rayner, the Anglican Archbishop, gave a
measured comment that 'there comes a point ... where there is less and
less respect being shown for the sacred in whatever form the sacred
comes, and you have to draw a line'.2 In reflecting on similar reactions
from Christians in the United States, a commentator on Serrano's
works dubbed it as no more than a 'conservative backlash' against
freedom of expression.3 A polemicised opposition between advocates
of artistic freedom and representatives of religious groups is promoted
by this kind of dismissive generalisation. It is heightened further when
outraged members of the churches withdraw from engagement with
the photograph, unable to articulate the nature of the offence it causes
beyond noting that the work suggests an act of indescribable
irreverence-a 'pissing on' Christ, through his representation in the
crucifix. This article will give a semiotic analysis of the photo, showing
how it plays with codes of artistic and religious representation. The
analysis has been made from viewing the reproduction alone, the
original having been removed from exhibition at the National Gallery
of Victoria after it was attacked by youths, using a hammer.4
1. Translucent Light.
In a letter to The Age, Alison Young notes that 'there is nothing in the
image that tells the spectator that they are looking at urine: the crucifix
appears suffused in a golden and roseate light. Only the title confesses
the nature of the liquid used' .5 A tension between the sensuous pleasures
of warmly-coloured light, and a knowledge of its (claimed) source in
an evacuated liquid, is a most obvious source of confusion and affront
in this work, prompted by this title. Serrano commented on this
tension, in an interview, noting that 'a lot of people have commented
on the title itself, saying if not for the title, the photograph would have
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been unnoticed. It wouldn't have caused the same sort ofprovocation' .6
One of the issues raised by the work is, precisely, the relationship
between its title and its subject-matter. Is 'piss' part of its content, or
only a colour? A letter to The Age misquotes the photograph's title as
'A crucifix in urine' and claims it has no relevance to the content of the
work at alL7 Archbishop George Pell, on the other hand, clarifies his
objection to the work by insisting that its title be taken literally: 'the
conjunction of the sacred symbol and excrement is recognised
universally as deeply insulting'.8 It is the idea of 'excrement' covering
the holy object that causes him offence, leading to a court-case in
which 'blasphemous libel' was the offence pleaded.9
The report of this plea suggests that it was put forward on the
assumption that the title discloses the subject-matter of the work, not
only its mode ofexecution. CliffPannam QC, advocate forthe Catholic
Archbishop, conceded that taken out ofcontext the photo had 'a certain
surreal quality', 10 a quality that derives from the play of light through
vibrantly translucent colours. He based his case, however, on a
consideration of the mode ofcreation suggested by the title. A viewing
of the work in light of this was what led to its blasphemous
suggestiveness for him. 'Blasphemy', in one of the senses given in
Webster's Dictionary, is 'irreverence toward something considered
sacred or inviolable'. Urinating on a crucifix, set aside for devotional
practices, would be a relatively unambiguous example, if directly
observed, and Pannam' s reported case is that the act is so strongly
implicit in the titled image as to make the charge relevant. It would be
simple to reply in his own terms: 'Taken out of context, that of a
photographic image, an act of urinating on a sacred object would be
"blasphemy" in the sense above. But can you actually establish that the
work conveys a derisive attitude toward the crucifix, when you consider
how the "piss" is used in its imagery?' Aesthetic questions, about the
relationship of the title to the work's content, cannot be avoided. The
question 'is this "blasphemy"?' might even be seen as invited by the
work. The derisive and mocking tone, taken further to define a
blasphemous intention, might indeed be found. But if it is so, it runs
deeper than the most obvious sense, of a sacrilegious act preceding the
taking of the photograph.
Serrano, responding to his critics, states that he would like to tell
people to 'go see the work, and then to respond to it rather than react to
hearsay and hysteria in the media' .11 In doing so, he draws attention to
the seemingly obvious need to give attention to the appearance of the
work, in assessing its content, rather than relying on its title or reputation
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alone. The term 'piss' connotes a rejected substance-transgressing
polite language-but it does not even begin to convey the special
effects of light achieved photographically with its use. Perceptible as
having their own beauty, the colours offer possibilities of pleasure,
quite apart from prejudice against the contemplation of 'piss', and
recognition of even momentary pleasure in them can serve to dislodge
the assurance of revulsion against the work. The substance of a
transgressive term is transformed into a source of pleasure-pleasure
in a light that seems to suffuse the cross. Serrano's further comment,
that he tries 'to make the images as seductive and beautiful as possible'I2
carries the message that people might be 'seduced' by the beauty of
that which they would normally find disgusting, if they put aside
preconceptions of what it is. A dominant aesthetic tradition stemming
from the eighteenth century would promote just this kind of
decontextualisation, suggesting that viewers respond to the qualities of
colour 'for themselves' , without contingent 'interests' in the substances
that produce them.
Serrano's declaration of an interest in the colour of the bodily fluids
he uses could be taken at face value, conveying an almost childlike
innocence in the play with them: a recollection of their first discovery
by an infant, who finds pleasure in bodily activities; intimations of a
time before guilt at misplaced urination had been entrained; a playful
jouissance. Allowing hegemony to this reading of innocence would,
however, prevent a concern with Serrano's more sophisticated play
with traditions of religious art. Medieval connotations are inevitable in
associations of light and religious imagery, and Serrano does not seem
to be ingenuous in his playing with these codes of representation.
Using a colour close to gold in order to depict transcendence, he takes
up a medieval tradition and gives it an ironic twist. Some perspective
on this irony can be gained by examining how the medievals understood
gold as a precious substance. Describing artworks of the tenth and
eleventh centuries, Karsten Harries notes that:
... every attempt was made to eliminate that which might suggest the
individual and the concrete. The artist tried to represent a disembodied,
immaterial reality. All suggestions of corporeality were carefully
avoided; human forms are seen in geometric abstractions. At this time
an anonymous monk introduced the gold background into Western
painting as a device to remove the portrayed events from the temporal. 13
Serrano's reversals of the code are obvious. That which has been
'eliminated' becomes the light; an individual corporeal act is the
source of a liquid providing golden colourations, symbolising the
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disembodied; an act of the least mundane significance, executed in a
hidden moment oftime, becomes the simulated glow oftranscendence-
or eternity. All that has been rejected is transformed, in a transmutation
of a liquid carrying the body's waste into a vehicle for creating a colour
of intrinsic worth, capable ofbeing contemplated 'for itself. Suggestions
of redeeming the unmentionable are clear. The product of a particular
body, in its enactments in a circumscribed time, are taken out ofa place
of hiddenness and shame to be displayed as worthy of being revered in
association with a holy image. This transformative effect need not be
taken as irreverent. Harries suggests that the medievals themselves
held a belief in continuity between material, sensuous, substances and
the 'higher' realms of being, and that it was this belief that gave them
courage to depict the 'eternal' .14 Serrano might be seen as taking up
this tradition and testing its limits. A bodily fluid is continuous with
other material substances in being a possible vehicle for the creation of
a 'golden' light. Why should the discontinuity of the debased from the
divine be assumed?
If challenging transformations are part of the work's game, they
cannot, even so, be fixed with too great a piety or seriousness. Like
many modem artworks, the photograph is capable ofmultiple meanings,
and a fixation on the most elevated would fail to acknowledge the
ludicrous. In the title, Serrano lays emphasis on the substance being
'piss'. For all the contemplative possibilities its colourational qualities
might allow, its physical nature cannot be entirely expelled from
memory, so strongly is it announced. It is Pannam's case, that 'Piss
Christ featured bubbles in the urine suggesting that it had been freshly
evacuated before the photograph was taken, and that the crucifix had
been urinated on' .15 A photograph inevitably conveys a greater illusion
of reality than painting, the buoyant bubbles here pointing at a freshly-
completed act 'outside the work'-outside 'art'. Evidence ofa painter's
brush strokes, or acts of throwing paint, may not refer so insistently
beyond the work as do these bubbles of thrown liquid. If awareness of
an artist's physical activity in more conventional media is induced by
the traces of action in paint, or the ridges on a sculpture, it might be
taken as relatively innocuous. The very suggestion of a urinating
adult-or his product-is, by contrast, able to promote the extremes of
dismay and disgust evident in some letters to the press, especially due
to the association of this act with a sacred object in this work. One
strategy for avoiding a surrender to spontaneous revulsion might be to
contemplate the image for its qualities alone, but take the absolutist
aesthetic too seriously, and you will fail to recognise that the
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photographer is 'taking the piss out of you' in your refusal to remember
the physical fact of production. Neither a protected stance of 'pure
contemplation', nor an unmediated reaction to the physical act of
urinating, can be sustained. The image disturbs by maintaining a
tension between them, achieving mobility in subverting any fixed
view. When the religious content of the image is considered, Serrano's
subversive stance towards an overly aestheticised view of art as
'absolute' becomes even more obvious. It is hardly a coincidence that
the attitudes of contemplative restraint espoused by Romantics as
suitable for the contemplation of art are also those encouraged in
contemplative traditions of religious practice, where symbols such as
the crucifix play a role. The Romantic theologian and hermeneutic
theorist, Friedrich Schleiermacher, actually sought to heighten the
sensitivity of his generation to the 'spiritual' by encouraging the
contemplation of works of art, where reverence toward 'absolute'
qualities could be learned. 'Piss Christ' both encourages and resists
this view. If a contemplation of the aesthetic qualities of colour is
called for in viewing it, an other-worldly amnesia is not permitted as a
final state, as some degree of revulsion is part of its point: a very
'interested', personal, reaction to the work without the pretence of
sanitised emotions and reverent self-control. This work asks for a
mode ofengagement which it also undermines, as the very Romanticised
glow which is so transformative of 'piss' permits visceral reactions,
and a questioning of 'what it is' that so draws the viewer into reverie.
Whether contemplative as an aesthete or a religious, viewers cannot
avoid the derailment of their most reverent attitudes.
A play on the means of creating an artistic representation of light
has now been seen in the possibility that a viewer might have an
oscillating awareness of colour and its material vehicle. The play is
mobilised further by what the image does not disclose of its origins. A
photograph might popularly be conceived as an undistorted image,
recording a place and event where the photographer was present. The
bubbles might make this impression of immediacy even more
compelling, as they did for Pannam, but few observations are needed to
recognise that the liquid light in this photograph could be taken as
something else, if its origin were not titled. and that its colours must
derive in part from the use of photographic filters (or other techniques),
unless a urological disturbance involving the passage of blood is to be
imagined. In what sense is this 'piss'? The photographer's
contemplation, in time, of the substance before him is implied in the
adaptation of its colour to an unusual 'roseate' glow. Any representation
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distorts its object to some degree, but a photograph can play more
effectively than most other media with the illusion of veridity, while
also playing with possibilities of distortion. A recognition of this
ilIusion only goes to increase the insecurity of a viewer uncertain of
what to see 'in' the work. For a New York journalist this uncertainty
itselfcould only have contributed to his seeing the work as 'deceptive',
as, in his words, it shows 'an image of radiant salvation actually
fabricated from filth' .16
2. Crucifix
Opposing Serrano's use of the colIoquial 'piss' is his naming of the
crucifix through the elevated tenn for 'Christ'. When this tenn is used
theologicalIy it may indicate divinity, in contrast to the name 'Jesus',
which speaks of a person with human nature, but in the pairing Serrano
gives it with 'piss', 'Christ' could be heard quite readily as an expletive,
uttered without any particular concern for high theology. His claim
about the title is that it 'was not meant to be critical, or hostile-it's
just descriptive'17 would be more believable if the two items were
taken separately, the first as the name for a brand of 'yelIow' peculiar
to Serrano's work, and the second as a common way of naming
Jesus-as the second person of the Trinity-but it cannot be denied
that there is a point to the juxtaposition of tenns. Serrano opposes a
marginal name for a rejected bodily fluid with a name that points to the
figure of Jesus as sacred and revered. This opposition is worked out in
reverse fonn by the visual image itself, where a 'glow' of urine
surrounds Jesus on the crucifix, rejected and marginalised, dead.
The offence of this image to Christians in general comes from its
targeting of a central moment in the narrative of the Gospels. That
other Christian statuettes immersed by Serrano in urine have not
created the same degree of offence may derive simply from the fact
that they do not represent such a crucial moment in salvitic history and
thought. The resonances of Jesus' death through New Testament
writings and Christian theology could hardly be greater, defining the
sense of 'Christian' itself. Hence Archbishop Pell' s plea that this' most
potent image' not be promoted as desacralised. A gutter-insult, 'piss
on you!', has been associated visually with a figure whose narrative
speaks of a free relinquishment of life, and whose experience of being
insulted is part of his passion. In the Catholic tradition of engaging
meditatively with the events of passion week, through symbols and
special liturgies, the crucifix asks a response of self-reflective
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remorse, not for denigration or insulting acts.
Yet Serrano claims not to have intended an insult. By commenting
that he was taught by Catholic Sisters 'that we worship not the crucifix
but Christ' ,18 he emphasises the disconnection of a symbol and any
metaphysical reality it might represent. It is the symbol that has been
immersed, not the person. By insisting on this separation, Serrano
actually points up the problematic features of the crucifix as an object
of devotion. As a symbol, it can be mass-produced and traded in.
Search for it on the Web, and you will find a list of religious jewellery
stores. A symbol with commercial value, it does not always ensure
domesticated devotion among ordinary Catholic people, or even a
pretence of recollecting the 'presence' of Christ. No horror of death
need attend this possession or accoutrement. If it inspires reverence
for some, it may be casual. Reproduce this symbol in a context
interpreted in traditional religious terms as 'violation' (due to the
'uncleanness' of bodily fluids), and the kind of shock it instigates
becomes more appropriate to the content of the image itself. The
crucifix can be sentimentalised and traded in, separated from the
thought of crucifixion as legal murder, but an act of violent artistic
displacement brings awareness in attentive viewers of this sanitisation
of brutality, inducing self-consciousness about how the symbol of
crucifixion has been over-used. The Uniting Church moderator, the
Reverend Pam Kerr, comments, for example, that the photograph
'reminds us Christians that the cross was a highly offensive event and
that Christ himself was treated brutally ... ' .19 The offence, or sense of
violation, felt by a viewer for whom the crucifix is a devotional object
can, then, be turned around, to become a reminder of the kind of
reaction that the subject-matter of crucifixion itself command. No
more realistic painted representation of an act of crucifixion as brutal,
or bringing agony, is necessary to this effect. Serrano's 'violation' of a
commercially-reproduced product in which the image of Christ is
benignly peaceful, and visually obscured, can still bring a shocked
recognition of felt offence. Nor is an explicit religious conviction on
the part of a viewer necessary to the image's effectiveness. Comparison
with a critic's reaction to another picture, entitled 'milk, blood', draws
out its capacity to stir memories of religious restraints, as violated,
even in those for whom religious practice has lapsed. Of secular Jewish
extraction, the critic Steven Dubin was confronted with the residue of
his own tradition, where Kosher laws determine that these substances
cannot be combined. He felt his shock as palpable, despite an absence
of religious conviction.20 Looking at 'Piss Christ' while aware of 'piss'
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can have a similar effect for a viewer who recognises in the crucifix a
central moment of Christian thought, whatever their own relationship
to this idea. Acts against the symbol are not merely acts against a
material thing, but offend a religious sensibility that many have thought
dead, even in themselves. A careless or disinterested tolerance toward
religious kitsch, in the form of a mass-produced plastic crucifix, is
transformed by this felt 'violation' into a stronger response. It is not a
defence of the representation that is at issue, but of a theological
conviction residual in many strands of Western culture, and imbibed
even by the habitually irreligious.
What, then, is this sensibility, which finds a 'blasphemy', or offence
against God, in the (presumed) immersion in urine of a crucifix? It
could be dismissed as a confusion of the symbol with the person and
action it represents, but the dismissal would be too simplistic. Few
people are subject to suspicions of occult properties in the symbol
itself, that is, to a primitive fetishism whereby the sign 'coincides with
what it indicates' .21 That does not mean, however, that religious
symbols lack any appreciable difference from their secular counterpart.
If their mass-produced replication allows forgetfulness, even among
Christians, about God as the one whose actions are represented, the
shock of felt violation brings a renewed sense that these symbols are
'set apart' by their place in ritual practices, such as acts of prayer. Even
if it is not, as Serrano points out, the crucifix itself that is worshipped,
it does serve in worship to direct a believer's attention to a redemptive
act whose relevance and present reality are a matter of faith. For one
who understands Christ as God, his 'presence' can be found both in an
historically complete redemptive act, and in a present moment of time,
a 'recollection' of this presence being facilitated by visible symbols
such as this. Some commitment is implicit in acts of prayer to a reality
beyond the symbol-a reality of God that makes the symbol more than
simply an idea, to be freely traded in. The use of the crucifix in
religious acts thus gives it a stronger sense of making 'present' a felt
reality than is the case for symbols in non-religious contexts. A flag is
an obvious example of secular symbol-use, a symbol of nationhood
that might be ritually saluted in a public event, but does not serve to
make nationhood more than a human conception. Acquiescence to the
idea of 'nationhood', and the usefulness of its symbolic representation,
need not entail a commitment to its being 'present' in any special
way-even if marching with flags does create feelings of unity among
participants. Acts of vandalism against the flag might certainly be
interpreted as insults to a nation, but the sense in which 'nationhood' is
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believed to be present in acts of flag-carrying is, nonetheless, weaker
than the sense in which God is taken by Christians to be present in acts
of devotion centred on the crucifix; 'nationhood' remains a human
conception, while 'Christ'-for the believer-is more than that. The
crucifix in Christian ritual bears a much stronger relationship with the
idea of a 'present-ing' reality, especially for those who are engaged in
a Catholic tradition of prayer.
This, then, is the crux of a conflict between the uses of symbols in
ritual practices with specifically religious intent, and the use of symbols
in secular rituals, or art. For a believing participant, the symbol is a
vehicle for worshipping God, understood as a reality apart from forms
of representation. For a non- believing observer, the symbol is an entity
that can be manipulated quite apart from its relationship to a set of
beliefs. It is the 'trespass of the sign', writes Kevin Hart, that it can be
separated from its motivating presence, and circulate freely with new
contexts and interpretations.22 To believers, the person of Christ is a
living sign of the present reality of God, and some might be motivated
to restrict the forms of his representation, but for others symbols of
Christ relate to belief-structures with no special claim of ontological
privilege. They can be treated as 'constructs' much like nationhood,
and their forms of symbolisation can be changed with impunity.
Umberto Eco explores what it is for an interpreter to work with such
constructs. Taking, as an example, the doctrine that 'there are two
natures in Christ, the human and the divine, and one Person', he notes
that the statement may be dismissed by a 'logician or scientist' as
lacking referent, but concedes that the dismissal would fail to
acknowledge its purchase in many people's lives,23 In Eco's view, it is
more profitable to acknowledge such statements as capable of having
meaning, than to dismiss them as 'untrue'. Understood minimally as
'cultural units', they can, he suggests, be explicated within their own
framework of reference, without forcing commentators into a position
of assent to a given theology or construction of 'truth'. A play like this,
with constructs of meaning and 'truth' by people uncommitted to a
particular set of beliefs, is neither revolutionary nor unusual. It is just
part of the normal game of interpretation, practised by anyone who
wants to understand a tradition to which he or she does not belong.
Bracketing the idea of 'truth', making it a construct irrelevant to
interpretation, does, however, limit outsiders in their capacity to
understand the force of a belief for someone who holds it as more than
a construct, even if fallible in its form. The same issue arises in the
formation and interpretation of art with religious content. A play with
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symbols as cultural units is part of the nonnal activity of art, not
demanding of the artist any particular commitment to a tradition
(except in the case of controlled traditions, such as icon-painting in
Orthodoxy). What may be for the artist or interpreter simply a play
with symbolic fonns, is nonetheless capable of holding a greater force
for an artist or viewer who links the symbols with a commitment to a
set of beliefs. Representations in language or art may be understood as
meaningful without any particular concern for their truth, but someone
who is not a participant in the tradition is in a subject-position where
they must necessarily be cautious in explicating-or condemning-
the feeling-tone of one who is a participant, and feels a personal affront
in the manipulation of symbols for their belief.
With this lengthy caveat in the name of tolerating the position of a
viewer affronted by this art, other possibilities of response might be
reconsidered. A state of affront can be transfonned, upon further
reflection, into one of recognising the manipulation of a symbol,
without taking it as a direct offence against belief. Viewers familiar
with, and engaged in, Catholic devotional practices are not excluded
from this possibility. They might chose to see in the representation of
'piss' a reminder that incamational theology has God made present in
human flesh, with all its unsanitary parts. Or they might recognise in
the haze of urine an ironical twist on the Romantic theme of using hazy
textures as means ofconveying sublimity, the prerequisite to 'wonder'.
This piece of artistic photography is not, after all, presented as
transparent vehicle for viewing, and responding to, the crucifix as an
object of devotion, but as a visual incitement to reflection on ways of
seeing it. Even a believer does not need to take any given presentation
of a symbol for Christ as the transparent vehicle for divine presence.
Nor does he or she need to take habitually-fonned states of altered
awareness, in devotional contexts, as unambiguously enlightening in
their effect. This artistic presentation, with the modes of interaction it
invites, can serve the purpose of unsaddling the self- conscious pride of
pseudo-piety. A moment of contemplative enjoyment meets a moment
of affront, and the two states oscillate, allowing a shift in awareness of
acts of devotion themselves. The context of the photograph's display
as 'modem art' is a cue to this kind of self-reflexive activity.
3. Participation and Publicity
A theme of Serrano's recent photographs (in the 'History of Sex'
series) is an exploration of the boundaries of what might be taken as
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'transgressive'. 'Piss Christ' anticipates the same theme by presenting
with vibrantly attractive colours an image that intimates the occurrence
of a transgressive act-pissing on a devotional object representing
Christ. The conflict of aesthetic values with aversive reactions to the
presumed act of creation further opens up the question of what it is
for something to be 'transgressive' or a 'sin'. Does the artistic end
justify the use of any materials, so placing the art in a domain outside
that of normal inhibitions? To supporters of the work, this is so.
Freedom to create is the value 'on the bottom line', and the fruitfulness
of the image in opening up a domain of interactive 'work' is support
of its privileged status. To opponents of the work's public exhibition,
its capacity to offend the semiotically unaware, for whom the symbol
is inviolably linked with a devotional attitude, is sufficient to ensure
its judgement as decadent art. An ethical dimension enters, and is
difficult to resolve. The work itself cannot proclaim the artist's
intentions, to offend or not, and the degree of 'guilt' attributed to
him depends largely on its interpretation. As the image invites a
participatory dialogue, not simply a passive response, the guilt
imputed to the artist by the viewer has to derive, at least in part, from
the viewer's own construction of what he or she sees, in relation to its
title. The act of urination can suggest desecration-a response that
reflects on the performative moment implied as preceding the work.
It might, further, suggest an act of angry defiance aimed at a symbol
which has come to represent 'the church' .The emotional associations
such an act could assume have the potential to be very complex,
illiciting further interpretive moves, as the viewer thinks of what the
crucifix, in its institutional use, connotes for him or her. Imagine,
for example, a viewer for whom the imagery of suffering has
been oppressive, in his or her own experience of church traditions.
The crucifix then symbolises an obsession with suffering, a lurid
fascination with it. This viewer might well find the idea of 'pissing
on it' satisfying, and see its representation with pleasure. If anger
were then to follow, it could be no more than an expression of his
own participatory guilt, or of his resentment at having been led
to enjoy the 'seductive beauty' of an image resulting from urination
on a crucifix-an act he would openly repudiate. The 'desecration'is,
from this viewer's position, an act of liberating (but uncomfortable)
resistance to memories of imposed remorse. It has invited enjoyment
in the beauty of its presentational form, but left him to deal with the
fact of his own enjoyment-with anger and guilt, or self-reflexive
questioning.
55
Literature and Aesthetics
It would be easy for a fictional viewer such as this to blame the
photographer for 'taking him or her in'-an 'innocent' viewer made to
feel unwelcome sentiments-but one of the questions the photograph
poses might very well be 'who is innocent?' Or 'whose guilt is
genuine, and not a mere revulsion for things he or she rejects in his or
her bodily selfl' The photographer's act and the viewer's participation
are part of the 'meaning' of the image as much as are its intrinsic
properties. The very lack of closure in the interpretive process that can
accompany viewing it is part of its point. If an emphasis is placed on
the mobility of self-questioning interpretation, Serrano could easily be
viewed as a religious artist, with a capacity to induce reflection on such
ideas as sin and guilt, death and suffering, the false rejection of
sensuousness or the pleasures of transgressive acts.
In the public debate about this photograph little consideration could
be given to the subtleties of questioning that it is able to provoke in
viewers with a sensitivity both to processes of sign-formation and to
Christian traditions. Instead, its display in the National Gallery of
Victoria was taken as an endorsement for the violation of a Christian
symbol, particularly offensive to those who belong to churches in
which the crucifix is used for devotional purposes. This assumption of
public support for representations offensive to religious groups says
nothing of the attitudes actually held by members of the Kennett
government, responsibility for the exhibition having been delegated
to the administration of the Gallery. Nor does it say anything of the
significations developed in the photograph itself. What it could indicate
is that an unprepared audience, responding more to the title than to the
image, too readily assumes a work's content to be obvious and
immediate, without any conception of its play on signs. Ifthis assessment
is right, ethical questions, relating to whether public institutions should
exhibit such art, could be treated separately from aesthetic judgements.
The ethical concerns would not arise out of an assessment of the
photograph's signification, as understood by the informed initiates of
modem representation, but from a concern about its capacity to create
offence among those who hold sincere religious beliefs, and are not
equipped to deal with an artistic play upon the symbols representing
them. This was the position implied by Behan McCullagh in a letter to
The Age, noting that 'we may criticise each other's beliefs and practices,
but in a respectful way, especially in public' .24 Many cheap
reproductions ofcrucifixes may be judged by the religious and irreligious
alike as displaying bad 'taste' in varying degrees, but this does not
mean that the crucifix is fair game for ridicule in a society where it
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represents a central value for at least some members. Serrano's photo
touches an uncomfortable and telling point where a symbol ceases to
be seen by all in the public as an item to be freely manipulated and
reproduced, and starts to be held instead as embodying a content that
asks for some restraint, without a necessary commitment to the Christian
faith. 25
If a distinction were upheld between judgements of the photograph
itself, and judgements of its possible effects on a broadly-based public,
it would not be inconsistent both to endorse the work aesthetically, as
offering an invitation to reflective activity, and to withhold commitment
to its being displayed in a public rather than a privately-endowed
gallery (which could conceivably receive public sponsorship, without
carrying the institutional image of official endorsement). A danger
with separating questions of aesthetic judgement from decisions about
public policy for supporting the art is, however, that it could come
across as patronising towards those who express offence, at the same
time as marginalising modern works of art by restricting their exhibition
in public galleries. It also leaves unexplored the possible intertwining
ofethical and aesthetic concerns. Would it not be possible for someone
to judge the photograph itself as ethically suspect, insofar as it seems to
manipulate (at least some) viewers into a shocked recognition of what
they are seeing-despite Serrano's claim not to be interested in 'shock'
but in getting people's attention?26 Art which merely exercises the
power of shock does not to move far beyond titillation, and that which
merely offends the religious does not transcend the cheapest acts of
iconoclasm. Are the claims of this article, that subtlety of interaction is
possible with this photograph, merely a withdrawal from its most
obvious content? A sceptical journalist, Robyn McKenzie, suggests
that 'the straightforward view of the man in the street' should be taken
seriously. It is, she thinks, the view that sees the work 'for what it is-
pornography, blasphemy-take your pick', rather than being duped by
'a pretentious intellectual elite'P Another art commentator, Evelyn
Tsitas, finds that Serrano's work reminds her 'of singer Madonna's use
of religious imagery. High gloss, camp, obvious. A crucifix here, a
sailor boy there, here an angel's head, there a man clutching his penis,
everywhere something intended to jolt you' .28 Perceptions of shock in
these comments are palpable, and it would take more than a bland
denial to convince that a capacity for shocking effect was not being
manipulated in some sense by the artist in creating these works. A
search for sophistication in response should not lead to blindness for
the obvious.
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Literature and Aesthetics
For any public debate on this art to make progress, it needs to move
away from a polemicisation which simplifies the position either of 'art-
lovers' or of members of religious groups. Neither an aestheticism that
isolates art from questions of value relating to its religious content, nor
a religious reactiveness that fails to attend to the image itself-after
reading its title-ean possibly do justice to the kind of dialogue the
work has a potential to promote. It would be naive to assume that
interpretive discourse on a work such as this can reach a point of
decisive closure, as the mobility it allows a viewer can encompass
many different interpretive positions, not all compatible. yet still
motivated by the work. A hammer-blow might have prevented further
viewing of the work, but it should not prevent discussion of the issues
it presents.
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